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Abstract 
 
A key objective to the global deployment of nuclear technology is maintaining transparency 
among nation-states and international communities.  By providing an environment in which to 
exchange scientific and technological information regarding nuclear technology, the safe and 
legitimate use of nuclear material and technology can be assured.   Many nations are 
considering closed or multiple-application nuclear fuel cycles and are subsequently developing 
advanced reactors in an effort to obtain some degree of energy self-sufficiency. Proliferation 
resistance features that prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material and reduce the likelihood 
of diversion from the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle are critical for a global nuclear future.   
 
IAEA Safeguards have been effective in minimizing opportunities for diversion; however, 
recent changes in the global political climate suggest implementation of additional technology 
and methods to ensure the prompt detection of proliferation.  For a variety of reasons, nuclear 
facilities are becoming increasingly automated and will require minimum manual operation.  
This trend provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for 
monitoring proliferation risk, especially in future facilities.   
 
A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency 
of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to resist proliferation associated 
with these activities.  Additionally, a framework designed to monitor processes will ensure the 
legitimate use of nuclear material.   
 
This report describes recent efforts to develop a methodology capable of assessing proliferation 
risk in support of overall plant transparency. The framework may be tested at the candidate site 
located in Japan:  the Fuel Handling Training Model designed for the Monju Fast Reactor at 
the International Cooperation and Development Training Center of the Japan Atomic Energy 
Agency. 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
Nuclear fuel cycle transparency is a high-level concept, defined as a confidence building 
approach among political entities, possibly in support of multi-lateral agreements, to ensure 
civilian nuclear facilities are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons.  
Additionally, nuclear fuel cycle transparency involves the cooperative sharing of relevant nuclear 
material, process, and facility information among all authorized parties to ensure the safe and 
legitimate use of nuclear material and technology.    
 
A system is considered transparent when the parties involved can evaluate for themselves 
whether or not the proliferation risk is at an acceptable level.  For this to occur, proliferation risk 
should be monitored in a continuous fashion. 
 
The intent of this research is to develop a framework capable of continuously assessing 
proliferation risk to support overall plant transparency.  A continuous, or real-time, analysis is 
important to increase the rapidity with which diversion might be detected.  Currently, it is 
difficult to assess proliferation risk on a continuous basis; for example, by updating risk as 
different plant processes are used. 
 
Figure 1 below describes a framework of nuclear fuel cycle transparency.  Data is collected from 
the nuclear facility and sent to a secure data base.  The transparency analysis software generates 
a proliferation risk to support transparency of the facility.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency Framework 
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The projected outcome of this research is the ability to determine inconsistencies in the operation 
of a nuclear facility through rapid analysis of plant process and monitor information.  It is 
important to note that following the analysis, the values obtained can be used to recommend 
changes to reduce proliferation risk.  Also, the analysis provides results and feedback to the site 
as well as all other authorized parties.  The framework is designed to support and maintain an 
acceptable level of proliferation risk. 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as an important international forum for 
scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology.  The agency 
serves as the world’s intergovernmental forum, applying nuclear safeguards and verification 
measures to civilian nuclear programs.  Nuclear technology for peaceful uses continues to 
expand under the IAEA safeguards pertaining to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), although 
membership to IAEA does not necessarily require membership to the NPT.  Under the treaty, 
and in compliance with Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines, nuclear technology can be exported 
for peaceful purposes.  Development of transparency methods based on automated remote 
monitoring may support exports for peaceful purposes, consistent with a global nuclear future. 
 
This research suggests the methodology and technology developed may augment IAEA 
verification tools by providing a scientific approach to monitoring facilities and will provide a 
common framework for monitoring the operation of exported nuclear technology.  Additionally, 
it will provide feedback to cooperating parties and will allow for full transparency of a nuclear 
fuel cycle; thus creating an environment in which all international parties are confident that 
nuclear power is safe, secure, and free of proliferation.  The framework may also support multi-
lateral nonproliferation agreements. 
 
As transparency increases confidence among nations, it also facilitates the transfer of technology.  
The current international political climate indicates a need for increased methods of non-
proliferation.  As President Bush clearly states in the following quote, nuclear technology may be 
exported to developing countries.  
 
“The world must create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants 
without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation.” 
 
~U.S. President George W. Bush, February 11, 2004 
 
However, a system would be desirable to promptly detect diversion of nuclear material, 
because misuse of enrichment or reprocessing activities may indicate a non-peaceful use 
of nuclear technologies. 
 
Additionally, the concepts developed by this research are useful in examining transparency 
issues of future technologies, such as the Fast Reactor Nuclear Fuel Cycles developed in Japan 
and the Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems being developed internationally.  As a result of 
the enhanced transparency of nuclear technologies and the associated confidence built among 
nation-states, the export of newly developed nuclear technology for peaceful purposes may be 
facilitated. 
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2.0 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency Framework 
 
2.1 Project Scope 
 
The scope of this research is to advance the concept of nuclear fuel cycle transparency as capable 
of collecting plant process data and real-time monitor information for the purpose of assessing 
the proliferation risk in a continuous manner to enhance transparency of nuclear facilities. 
 
2.2 Project Goals 
 
The goal of this research is to develop a transparency framework capable of using plant process 
and monitor data to assess proliferation risk at a nuclear facility as it operates. 
 
In the near future, the transparency framework may be demonstrated at a candidate site.  The 
demonstration will establish a Transparency Test Bed to demonstrate application of the nuclear 
fuel cycle transparency framework for verification and validation of material process flow.  This 
test bed will provide the basis for adding safety and other features also important to transparent 
operation. 
 
Long term goals of this project include building the transparency concept into the design of 
nuclear facilities before they are deployed throughout the world.  Additionally, it is our 
expectation that the transparency framework will be utilized to integrate other aspects of 
nonproliferation control, such as IAEA safeguards.   
 
2.3 Project Objectives 
 
Objectives of this research project include the following: 
• Collaborate with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency to develop techniques that will 
enhance international confidence in safe, secure operations and handling of nuclear 
material. 
• Foster international collaborations leading to workable, effective, globally accepted 
standards for the transparency methodology of nuclear material. 
• Focus on the secure operation of nuclear facilities and the secure handling of nuclear 
material. 
• Develop a quantitative framework to evaluate proliferation risk in support of facility 
transparency within the nuclear fuel cycle in real-time.  (Transparency Analysis Software, 
described below.) 
• Incorporate plant process information and procedures to utilize the existing data to the 
fullest extent (Transparency Toolbox, described below). 
• Survey the field of detectors, sensors, and communication technologies currently in use 
or under development to improve the transparency of the nuclear process (Transparency 
Toolbox, described below). 
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Figure 2 describes the transparency framework and includes the Transparency Toolbox and the 
Transparency Analysis Software.  As data is pulled from the secure data base, it enters the 
transparency toolbox where it is aggregated.  Data is then sent to the Transparency Analysis 
Software.  In this stage, a value of proliferation risk is determined. 
 
The Transparency Toolbox and Transparency Analysis Software are described below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency Framework 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Transparency Toolbox 
 
The Transparency Toolbox contains the system by which data is collected and aggregated.  It 
contains the information necessary to support the analysis.  These tools include information from 
the available field of detectors, sensors, and communication technologies currently in use or 
under development.  Additionally, plant process design information is housed in the 
Transparency Toolbox.   
 
In this portion of the framework, raw data is continuously collected and placed in a secure data 
base.  The data is aggregated and processed before passing it to the analysis software.   
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The Transparency Toolbox has the following primary functions: 
• Utilizes Plant Process Data in the context of defined Plant Operating Procedures 
• Provides information on additional technology support, including: 
o Automation technologies 
o Specialized monitoring techniques 
o Commercially available technologies 
o Advanced sensors 
• Houses a database which lists usable technologies and performance data 
• Divides data streams into three categories: 
o Monitoring data – surveillance data, images, etc. 
o Sensing data – door switches, motions detectors, radiation sensors, etc. 
o Security data – intrusion alarms, etc. 
• Based on technologies and raw data, formulates processed data needed by the 
Transparency Software to calculate proliferation risk. 
 
2.3.2 Transparency Analysis Software 
 
The Transparency Analysis Software contains the system by which the proliferation risk of a 
nuclear facility can be calculated.  Additionally, the Transparency Analysis Software performs 
the following tasks: 
• Provides a structure for the design of the application at nuclear facilities. 
• Provides a structure where plant observations are analyzed in real-time and compared to 
expectations. 
• Analyzes data and performs analyses based on processed data obtained from the 
Transparency Toolbox. 
• Provides a process or method to aggregate information into a useful measurement of the 
change in proliferation risk. 
• The final measurement compares two quantitative analyses of overall proliferation risk at 
a nuclear facility in a timely fashion: 
o Static risk:  This analysis of proliferation risk is not time-dependent.  It is 
considered a “fixed value” or a “baseline” and is generated as a result of expected 
signals, plant process information, and plant design information. 
o Dynamic risk:  This analysis of proliferation risk is time-dependent.  It ultimately 
measures the change in proliferation risk relative to the static risk.  The dynamic 
calculation is made from observed signals that are constantly being updated. 
 
In the future, the Transparency Analysis Software may recommend procedures to further reduce 
proliferation risk, model historical trend information, and initiate response actions. 
 
The Transparency Analysis Software is necessary to apply a methodology to quantitatively 
assess the proliferation risk at a nuclear facility.  The continuous information provided by the 
Transparency Analysis Software will yield a timely non-proliferation assessment under global 
conditions which can change quickly and without warning.  This analysis is necessary to design, 
support, and maintain transparent systems. 
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3.0 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency Concepts 
 
In recent years, there has been an increased need for additional protocols with other descriptive 
and quantifiable methods to ensure transparency (IAEA-INFCIRC/540, 1997).  Although 
international safeguards are critical, it is also important to characterize explicitly the uncertainty 
associated with each step in the process of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
Currently, evaluations of nuclear fuel cycle transparency involve qualitative analyses of nuclear 
facilities, such as volunteer sharing of process information and publicly accessible video 
cameras.  This qualitative judgment can be difficult to analyze or reproduce.   
 
This section of the report describes the current efforts to quantify nuclear fuel cycle proliferation 
risk in order to achieve transparency. 
 
3.1 Transparency Factors 
 
A nuclear fuel cycle is transparent when the parties involved can assess the proliferation risk for 
themselves and determine that it is acceptably low.  Thus, a detailed calculation of proliferation 
risk must be performed.  Probabilistic risk assessment is often used as a way of computing the 
risk of a particular system or failure mode.  Often this risk is expressed as the product of the 
probability or frequency of an event and the consequences of the event.  However, by using the 
transparency framework discussed earlier in this report, a specific and timely calculation of risk 
may be performed. 
 
This section will define a few of the quantitative factors relative to a proliferation risk 
calculation.  The top-level mathematics associated with these factors will be discussed in 
subsequent sections. 
 
3.1.1 Expectations 
 
Expected signals, or data from plant processes or equipment as designed, used in this 
methodology are “baselines” used to determine the expected, or static, risk.  As the analysis 
progresses, expected signals are aggregated with other expected information, such as plant 
process and plant design information; for instance, a certain material involved in a certain 
process will yield an expected risk.  By comparing the expected signals to the real-time 
information generated by subsequent analyses, an evaluation of the change in proliferation risk 
can be made.  If the continuous data collected meets or falls below expectations, proliferation 
risk is nominal or reduced. 
 
Expected Signals + Process Information + Plant Designs → Static Risk 
 
 
3.1.2 Observations 
 
Observed signals are the measured, real-time, constantly changing conditions in the plant.  As 
these data are analyzed, results observed are aggregated with other expected information, such as 
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plant process and plant design information.  The data is then processed to yield a real-time, or 
dynamic, risk.  By continuously comparing the static risk to the dynamic risk generated by the 
analysis, an evaluation of proliferation risk can be made.  If the observed signals do not meet 
expectations, proliferation risk is increased. 
 
Observed Signals + Process Information + Plant Designs → Dynamic Risk 
 
Since the transparency toolbox already contains plant process information and plant designs, 
only the observed signals need to be accumulated in a timely fashion. 
 
A more detailed description of Expectations and Observations may be found in section 4.0. 
 
3.1.3 Material Attractiveness 
 
Many methods are available for calculating proliferation risk (Jones, 2003).  However, for 
illustration, the framework developed includes material attractiveness as a key aspect of 
proliferation risk.  
 
Material attractiveness represents the quantification of several factors concerning the diversion 
potential of nuclear material throughout the process flow of the nuclear fuel cycle.  This factor 
determines a value representative of how attractive a certain material would be for purposes of 
proliferation. 
 
3.2 Process Flow 
 
Process flow refers to the movement, activity, or any processes associated with the nuclear 
material in the fuel handling cycle at a specific facility.  Process flow information is crucial for 
the analysis, since each step in the process involves a separate comparison of observations to 
expectations.  This information is well defined, structured, and organized and placed into the 
secure facility database.   
 
This research examines an automated fuel handling process designed for Monju Fast Breeder 
Reactor.  As an example, Table 1 describes some of the process flow information relevant to 
Monju.  This information is specific to the movement of nuclear material from the Ex-Vessel 
Storage Tank to the Reactor Core and back at the Fuel Handling Training Model designed for the 
Monju Fast Breeder Reactor.   
 
In the table below, each bullet in the process flow represents a node of information that could be 
collected to verify the movement or activity of the nuclear fuel in the nuclear fuel cycle facility.  
Information in this table represents some of the expectations that would be collected to calculate 
a static risk.  
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Table 1: Monju Fuel Handling Model Process Flow. 
(Acronyms defined in the glossary of terms.) 
 
FHM Positioned over selected Spent Fuel Assembly 
     FHM Limit Position Switch over the spent fuel assembly 
     FHM-Spent fuel assembly (SFA) attachment sensor 
     FHM-SFA lift sensor 
     FHM-SFA position switch over the IVTM pool 
FHM transfers the SPF to the IVTM 
     FHM-SFA lowering sensor 
     FHM-SFA detachment sensor 
     FHM stow position switch 
EVTM is positioned over EVST at desired position for Fresh Fuel Assembly 
     EVTM limit position sensor 
EVTM extracts Fresh Fuel Assembly (FFA) from EVST 
     EVTM crane lower sensor 
     EVTM attachment sensor to FFA 
     EVTM crane lift sensor 
     EVTM crane position switch in the coffin A 
EVTM moves to reactor 
     EVTM movement sensors 
     EVTM position sensor over reactor core 
EVTM transfers FFA to IVTM 
     EVTM crane lowering sensor  
     EVTM crane lowering stop sensor 
     EVTM crane detachment sensor 
     EVTM crane retraction sensor 
     EVTM crane position sensor in the coffin A 
 
 
If this transparency framework is to be implemented internationally, subsequent studies will 
require examining process flow information for each individual reactor type on a plant-wide 
basis.  This specificity and flexibility of the framework allows for ease of implementation in all 
aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
3.3 Secure Transfer of Information 
 
The client-server database serves as the intermediary for the transfer of information between the 
nuclear fuel cycle facility and the organization conducting the transparency analysis.  The Client-
Server functions are as follows: 
 
• Collects pertinent information for the transparency analysis from the internal 
nuclear fuel cycle facility database or electronic logging system. 
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• Packages and encrypts the information for secure transfer through a virtual 
private network. 
• Acts as a second line of defense for access to nuclear fuel cycle facility 
information. 
 
The following diagram depicts the flow of process data from the facility through the Client-
Server through the Virtual Private Network to the remote site for analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Secure Transfer of Information 
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4.0 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency Mathematics 
 
This section provides a high-level overview of the mathematical equations involved in 
performing the transparency analysis.  It has been previously stated that proliferation risk, and 
ultimately fuel cycle transparency, is a function of the following: 
• Material attractiveness: obtained from quantification of factors relating to proliferation of 
a specific material. 
• The static (baseline) risk: obtained from standard process and monitor information.  This 
value is calculated from expected signals from a particular process, plant process 
information, and plant design information. 
• The dynamic (changing) risk: obtained from real-time processes and measurements.  This 
value is calculated from observed signals from a particular process, plant process 
information, and plant design information. 
 
4.1 Material Attractiveness (m) 
 
Material attractiveness is a pre-determined value based on the following factors: 
• Material Weapons Capability: How easily a specific material could be converted into 
weapons material. 
• Material Detectibility:  How easily the material could be detected by standard monitoring 
equipment. 
• Material Handleability:  How easily an adversary could handle the material; a function of 
the material’s activity.   
• Material Accessibility:  How accessible the material is to adversaries (for example, in-
core material would be less accessible than material in the receiving area). 
• Material Quality:  The type of radiation the material emits, and the activity of the 
material. 
• Material Quantity:  The amount of material. 
 
Material attractiveness is also determined based on the type and size of reactor.  At this time in 
the research, engineering judgment will be used to evaluate possible values of material 
attractiveness for a Fast Reactor.  This judgment incorporates the assumption that spent fuel is 
more attractive to an adversary than fresh fuel, but less attractive than irradiated blanket fuel, due 
to the fuel cycle of a breeder reactor.  
 
4.2 Static Risk (s) 
 
Static risk is calculated from the “baseline” expected signals, plant process information, and 
plant design information.  It is the result of an analysis of expectations for each plant process.  
Known values, such as type of material, material attractiveness, and material transfer information 
are aggregated in the transparency toolbox and are then analyzed.  A static risk, which can be 
described as a “baseline value”, is determined for further comparison. 
 
static risk (s) = the normal operational risk obtained from expected signals, process information, 
and plant design 
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4.3 Dynamic Risk (d) 
 
Dynamic risk is calculated based on observed signals, plant process information, and plant 
design information.  Real-time raw data from monitors and sensors is aggregated in the 
transparency toolbox to detect deviations from expected signals and a value of “d” is calculated.  
A dynamic risk is determined for each plant process based on real-time data and is a non-zero 
value if there exist deviations from expected signals (i.e., a suspect activity is occurring).  
Dynamic risk has a value of zero when there are no deviations from expected signals (i.e., 
activities are normal).  It is then analyzed by the transparency software.   
 
dynamic risk (d) = the real-time risk obtained from observed deviations from expected signals 
 
4.4 Proliferation Risk (R) 
 
The following symbols are used in subsequent equations: 
N = Proliferation Risk under Normal operations 
R = Proliferation Risk 
s = Static Risk 
m = Material Attractiveness 
d = Dynamic Risk (deviations from expected signals) 
 
Proliferation Risk under Normal operations = the normal operational risk obtained from 
expected signals 
 
(1) N = s 
 
In the event that declared plant process data is not being followed, there exists an increase in 
proliferation risk, such that: 
 
Change in proliferation Risk = material attractiveness multiplied by the real-time risk obtained 
from observed deviations from expected signals 
 
(2) ∆R = md 
 
Since “d” is defined as either a zero or non-zero value, if plant process data is producing 
observed signals that do not deviate from expected signals, d = 0.  However, if diversion of 
material is occurring, there exists a deviation of observed signals from expected signals.  This 
will alert that incorrect procedures are being followed; either incorrect transfers of material are 
occurring, or the incorrect material is being used in a particular process.  “d” then becomes a 
non-zero value.  Thus ∆R is increased by a factor of m, the material attractiveness.   
 
Proliferation risk = Proliferation Risk under Normal operations added to the Change in 
Proliferation Risk 
 
(3) R = N + ∆R 
   
 19 
 
Thus: 
 
Proliferation Risk = the normal operational risk obtained from expected signals, plant process 
information, and plant design information, added to the material attractiveness multiplied by the 
real-time risk obtained from deviations from expected signals 
 
(4)  R = s + md 
 
Equation (4) applies to a single plant process.  For a site-wide value of proliferation risk, R must 
be aggregated in the Transparency Analysis. 
 
As shown in Equation (4), when proliferation is not occurring, d = 0, thus R = s.  When 
proliferation might be occurring, d ≠ 0, thus R = s + md.  Material attractiveness becomes an 
important factor during the latter case.  Figure 4 describes this process. 
 
4.5 Transparency 
 
In this framework, transparency is a high-level concept that is not measured on a quantitative 
scale.  When all parties can evaluate that the proliferation risk is acceptable (thus, the static risk 
is at an acceptable level and there is a method to continuously calculate the dynamic risk) the 
system can be considered to be transparent.   
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Figure 4. Data Flow Through Transparency Toolbox and Analysis Software 
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5.0 Conclusion 
 
This research will proceed in two additional phases.  In Phase I, described by this report, a 
collaborative effort between Sandia National Laboratories and Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
advanced a transparency framework and implemented an example methodology for measuring 
proliferation risk.  This provided the conceptual framework for a remote verification and 
validation process for monitoring proliferation risk in support of transparency at a nuclear fuel 
cycle facility. 
 
In the next step, Phase II, a demonstration of the nuclear fuel cycle transparency framework is 
needed to confirm the utility of the framework.  It is expected that Phase II will provide 
improvements to the concept of transparency, the development of new technology, and the 
capability for extensive analysis at the facility-level.  This demonstration is discussed further in 
Section 6.0. 
 
The concept of the nuclear fuel cycle transparency framework requires an operational 
demonstration on a test bed to further establish the contribution to reducing the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and support the evolution of nuclear fuel cycles.  At the completion of Phase II, 
a Transparency Test Bed may be established to demonstrate the use of real-time plant process 
data and implement the nuclear fuel cycle transparency framework.  It will become the objective 
of this research to begin testing these improvements and developments at an operating nuclear 
facility, ideally the Monju Fast Breeder Reactor.   
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6.0 Proposed Demonstration Of Framework And 
Methodology 
 
The purpose of the proposed demonstration is to extend the Phase I work into a demonstration of 
nuclear fuel cycle transparency between Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Japan 
Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA).  The Monju Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) has been selected as 
the candidate site.  Utilizing the unique training facilities at the Monju FBR, the framework may 
be tested at the Fuel Handling Training Model at the International Cooperation and Development 
Training Center, operated by the JAEA. 
 
6.1 Demonstration Scope 
 
The demonstration consists of two key aspects: 
1. Collection and transfer of data from the Training Model to Sandia National 
Laboratories. 
2. Data analyses made to determine:  validity and importance of the data collected, 
proliferation risk, and transparency. 
 
6.2 Demonstration Goals 
 
The goal of this demonstration is to apply the Phase I work, the development of a transparency 
framework, to a working demonstration at the Fuel Handling Model developed for the Monju 
FBR.  Work will be performed to provide a computer synchronized to the visible movements in 
the model to mimic facility operations and supply process data, transmit this data to a secure data 
base at the International Cooperation and Development Training Center, and then to transmit this 
data to a secure data base operated by analysts at Sandia National Laboratories.  A real-time 
analysis of simulated proliferation risk will be demonstrated using the analysis software.  
 
6.3 Demonstration Objectives 
 
Key demonstration objectives include the following: 
• With the assistance of the Training Model at the candidate site, the Monju FBR, develop, 
test, and demonstrate transparency measures and technologies for an automated  nuclear 
fuel cycle component. 
• Collaborate with the Monju FBR staff to develop tools that will enhance international 
confidence in safe, secure operations and handling of nuclear material. 
• Foster international collaborations leading to workable, effective, globally accepted 
standards for the transparent analysis of nuclear facilities. 
 
Figure 5 displays the Fuel Handling Training Model to be used in the proposed demonstration. 
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6.4 Roles of SNL and JAEA 
 
Reflecting that both parties have cooperated to develop the concept in Phase I, the Phase II effort 
will continue to emphasize mutual efforts: 
• SNL and JAEA will jointly develop specifications for the simulated process data for the 
Phase II demonstration.  
• JAEA will make arrangements to acquire the agreed signals.  
• SNL will support JAEA in establishing the secure data transmission system. 
• SNL will receive the data from JAEA and perform the data analysis.  
• SNL and JAEA will jointly develop the proliferation resistance evaluation methodology.  
• Both sides will cooperate to observe information control and proprietary interests as 
mutually agreed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Fuel Handling Training Model at the International Cooperation and 
Development Training Center 
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7.0 Glossary Of Terms 
 
Dynamic Risk:  The real-time risk obtained from observed deviations from expected signals.  
Dynamic risk is based on observed signals, process flow information, and plant design 
information. 
Expectations:  Data that is expected during the analysis, often based on plant process and plant 
design information.  If the real-time data collected meets expectations, proliferation risk is 
nominal.  Expectations are used to calculate static risk. 
Material Attractiveness:  A quantified, pre-determined value regarding the potential for 
diversion of different nuclear materials throughout the process flow of the nuclear fuel cycle, 
based on their usefulness to construct a nuclear weapon. 
Methodology:  The practices and procedures necessary to implement the Transparency 
Framework. 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transparency:  A confidence building approach among political entities to 
ensure civilian nuclear facilities are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons; a 
high-level concept. 
Observations:  Data that is observed during the analysis; the measured, real-time, constantly 
changing conditions in the nuclear facility.  Observations can be based on plant process and plant 
design information.  Observations are used to calculate dynamic risk. 
Process Flow / Plant Process Information:  The documented movement, activity, or any 
process associated with the nuclear material in the fuel handling cycle at a specific facility.  This 
information is used to calculate static and dynamic risk. 
Proliferation Risk:  A numerical value representative of the risk that proliferation of nuclear 
materials might occur at a nuclear facility. 
Static Risk:  The “base-line” or normal operational risk obtained from expected signals, process 
flow information, and plant design information. 
Transparency Analysis Software:  A process of the Transparency Framework that analyzes 
static and dynamic risk to calculate proliferation risk. 
Transparency Framework: The fundamental structure of the transparency concept advanced by 
this research. 
Transparency Toolbox:  It contains the information necessary for performing the analysis, 
including information from detectors, sensors, and communication technologies and plant 
process and plant design information. 
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